The Upgrade of the Belfast to Bangor Railway Line

A report published today by John Dowdall CB, the Comptroller and Auditor General for Northern Ireland, examines the upgrade of the Belfast to Bangor railway line carried out by Translink in 2001. One of the busiest railway lines in Northern Ireland, carrying nearly 2 million passengers a year, it was in need of refurbishment and in January 2001, the Department for Regional Development approved a project to completely re-lay the line.

The Comptroller and Auditor General’s Report showed:

Part 1: There was a very significant overspend on the project:

• The project was approved with a budget of some £15 million and was scheduled for completion by December 2001. However the project experienced a number of difficulties, resulting in a very significant overspend and late delivery.
• The final cost of the project was almost £34 million and it was completed nine months later than planned in September 2002.

Part 2: The overspend was the result of failures in several key areas:

• There were serious deficiencies in the economic appraisal which under-estimated the cost of the project. The Department accepted Translink’s assurances on the accuracy of these estimates and allowed the project to proceed even when it became apparent that projected costs were well in excess of the budget.
• Maunsell Rail, Translink’s lead engineering consultants, did not specify the contract properly and failed to deliver track designs. These failures contributed to multi-million pound claims from the construction contractor (Mowlem Rail). Translink’s ability to control these cost increases was severely prejudiced by omissions in the tender documentation prepared by Maunsell and the absence of effective contract variation procedures.
• Translink terminated Maunsell’s appointment by agreement in November 2001. Even though much of the increased cost resulted from Maunsell’s failures, no damages can be recovered because the Termination Agreement effectively waived Translink’s right to claim. It is difficult to be exact about the quantum of any loss to the public purse. However we estimate the potential loss is in the region of £8 million to £13 million.
• In addition to the increased cost of the project, there is uncertainty as to whether it has delivered all of its intended benefits. The original specification of a 90 mph speed limit was reduced to 70 mph and other works on bridges and sea defences were removed from the contract to reduce costs.

Part 3: Action is required to improve future performance:

• Many of the problems which arose on the project could have been avoided or their effects lessened if Translink had managed the project properly. Translink had no procedures for project management or the management of consultants and there were shortcomings in procurement practices.
• Translink’s documented record was very poor; key decisions were not recorded and documents were destroyed by a senior official.
• There were indications of excessive generosity to Translink staff and the Board failed to provide effective oversight on decisions which put public funds at risk.
• Translink has made progress with plans to improve project management but implementation in some areas has been slow.
• The Department stated that significant lessons have been learned and that action has been taken to improve its control of Translink capital projects.