Navan Centre

A report published today by John Dowdall CB, the Comptroller and Auditor General for Northern Ireland, concluded that the forecasts of visitor numbers to the Navan Centre were unrealistic and that the failure to achieve these targets contributed to the serious financial difficulties which the Centre experienced (paragraph 4.1). It was opened in July 1993 as a visitor and interpretative centre at Navan Fort which is situated just outside Armagh and is the premier archaeological earthwork in Northern Ireland. The report to Parliament points out that visitor numbers to the Centre, were substantially lower than the forecasts in the original business plan of 160,000 annual visitors within ten years. The reality was that annual visitor numbers never exceeded 50,000 and averaged 33,000 over the eight years that the Centre was open. As a result it failed to achieve commercial viability and required continuing financial support from a number of public bodies until it closed in June 2001.

Main Findings (Introduction and Summary)

Although a visitor centre was successfully established, employment opportunities and economic activity were significantly below expectations due mainly to the inability to achieve the projected visitor numbers. When it became clear, at an early stage, that commercial viability would not be achievable the Centre was affected by the continued lack of certainty regarding future funding (paragraphs 1.11 and 1.12).

The Centre received funding totalling more than £5 million pounds (3.1) from a range of Government Departments and public bodies. Prior to devolution the former Department of the Environment was the Department with the most interest in the venture because of its statutory responsibility for Navan Fort and after devolution the Department of Culture Arts and Leisure (DCAL) had the lead role in relation to funding the Centre. This was because it had the necessary statutory authority to support the Centre by means of a revenue subsidy (1.13).

The Audit Office found that the absence of formal clearly defined lines of departmental responsibility and of a co-ordinated approach to the company and its operation created confusion. The report recommends that clear understandings between Departments should be reached right at the beginning of cross-cutting projects such as this and responsibility for accountability and monitoring arrangements established from the outset (1.13 and 1.14).

The report recognises that a project such as this is crucially dependent on the efforts of unpaid Trustees and Directors who give their time and expertise on a voluntary basis (1.15).

DCAL told us that among the lessons learned was the importance of clarifying the roles and responsibilities between funding Departments (1.16).

Following closure of the Centre, DCAL said that it had made sustained efforts to work with Armagh City and District Council, the Trustees, the National Trust and other interested parties to find a way forward, although these efforts proved unsuccessful. We now understand that there have been on-going discussions between the Trustees and Armagh City and District Council aimed at reaching an agreement whereby the Council would take over the Centre (1.25).

On Visitor Numbers and Marketing (Part 4)

The financial viability of the Centre depended crucially on revenue generated by visitors through admission fees and also from profits from the shop and café. We have already indicated that the basis for forecast numbers was unsound from the outset but the effects of political unrest, particularly those associated with the Drumcree protest, and the foot and mouth restrictions in 2001 contributed to the absence of visitors (paragraphs 4.1 and 4.4)

On Monitoring of the Centre (Part 5)

Navan had direct funding relationships with ten organisations including four Government Departments. The Audit Office found that there was no clear lead responsibility on the part of those Departments and, as a result, the monitoring of the operation of the Navan Centre was less than satisfactory. In addition, for much of the time, no Department was carrying out a regular and detailed review of the underlying trading performance of the company (paragraphs 5.1 to 5.3).

The Departmental committee set up in 1998 to monitor the operation of the Centre and to ensure that value for money in the use of public funds was achieved met representatives of Navan on only three occasions and the record of these discussions suggests that they were rarely used by Departmental officials to probe present and future trading (5.4).

The Audit Office found that the oversight of Navan, particularly in the early stages, lacked vigour given the status of the company directors involved and Departmental officials dealing with the Centre do not seem to have exercised a strong challenge function. The report also points out that there was no formally agreed protocol between Government Departments on Accounting Officer responsibility for the Navan Centre (5.10).

On the Local Museums and Heritage Review (Part 6)

From 1997 onwards, financial support for the Centre was presented essentially as buying time assistance to allow for the completion of a review of local museum and heritage provision. The report considers that unrealistic expectations were placed on this review as a means of providing a long-term funding solution for Navan and that it was surprising that decisions on the future of funding for the Navan Centre were postponed for several years pending the review’s completion (paragraph 6.5).